Strengthening the non-proliferation regime: French views

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CEA missions

- R&D missions in the fields of nuclear and renewable energies,
- role of adviser of the French government in matters of foreign nuclear policy,
- CEA:
  - represents France in international organizations in the nuclear sector (e.g. IAEA, CTBTO, OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency)
  - takes part in preparing the review conferences of the NPT
  - is responsible for the technical aspects of the CTBT application
  - is directly involved in international negotiations relating to the control of sensitive exports (Zangger Committee, NSG)
Implementation of international safeguards in France

- **Nuclear materials in France submitted to controls exercised:**
  - by the operators,
  - by the national authority (the High representative for defence in the Ministry of Industry),
  - by the European Commission,
  - by the IAEA.

- **Euratom control exercised by the European Commission over all civil nuclear materials (section VII Euratom Treaty):**
  - 356 inspections conducted by the European Commission in 2010 (1389 person days of inspection)

- **IAEA safeguards applied to materials subjected to specific legal commitments (France or Euratom/third-State agreements...):**
  - 3 facilities designated: La Hague, Melox, Georges Besse II
Management of international safeguards in France

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
SGAE: Secretary General for European Affairs (Prime Minister’s services)
CTE: Euratom Technical Committee (Prime minister's services) within CEA
Governor: Governor for France at the IAEA within CEA
CEA: French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission
IRSN: Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety
French policy in non proliferation

➢ 3 main issues:

✓ responding resolutely to proliferation crises

✓ reinforcing substantive efforts to prevent and impede proliferation

✓ strengthening the non-proliferation regime
Responding resolutely to proliferation crises

- Proliferation crises undermine our collective security,
- Proliferation crises undermine mutual trust and hinder the development of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
- It is to the detriment of the vast majority of States that are abiding by their obligations in good faith.

- long lasting and worsening crises in Iran and DPRK
- Syrian issue recently reported to the UNSC

Combating proliferation is vital to the security of all
Prevent and impede proliferation

- Exports need to be controlled more effectively, especially for the most sensitive nuclear technologies, equipment and materials: essential condition to the development of the nuclear trade,

- Positive outcome of NSG negotiations on the supervision of the transportation of equipment and technology linked to enrichment and re-processing: measures adopted in July by NSG set out an adapted framework for the transfer of these sensitive technologies,

- Access to training in the most sensitive areas has to be controlled,

- Proliferation activities have to be criminalized,

- Resolute international and national efforts to combat proliferation financing have to be made;

- Measures should be taken to manage and monitor intangible transfers of knowledge and know-how,

- The development of proliferation-resistant technologies should be supported.
Strengthening the non-proliferation regime

• IAEA plays a key role in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime,

• Agency needs support in its efforts to ensure that its safeguards system remains fully effective and credible

• 2 main objectives:

  ✓ universal application of the IAEA’s safeguards system

  ✓ strengthening of the IAEA’s safeguards system
Universal application and strengthening of IAEA’s safeguards

- **Aiming at the universalization of the additional protocol**
  - Credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a state

- **Verification standard should be CSA + AP**
  - Demarches to promote the AP undertook on behalf of the G8 group

- **Ensuring that the Agency continues to have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to fulfill its verification mission effectively.**
  - Member states support programmes
  - French support programme: total contribution is estimated to be worth around 1.5 million euros a year
Universal application and strengthening of IAEA’s safeguards

- Encouraging the IAEA to make full use of the authority available to it:
  - pursuing the development of a State-level safeguards approach;
  - pursuing the implementation of integrated safeguards (linked to promotion of the AP);
  - supporting Agency's efforts in the development of a safeguards system that is more information driven and objectives-based;
  - relying more broadly on information from and cooperation with strong independent national or regional safeguards systems (e.g. EURATOM);
  - effecting, whenever the DG determines that circumstances call for it, a special inspection as provided for by paragraphs 73 (b) and 77 of INFCIRC/153.
Universal application and strengthening of IAEA’s safeguards

- **Enhancing the use of information relevant to the delivery of the IAEA mandate**

- **IAEA is not and shall not become an export control regime but:**
  - it could be helpful to define areas where information stemming from export control regimes or from bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements might be useful to its mission,
  - rules to be carefully considered in order to protect the integrity of those regimes and confidentiality;

- **Circulating more accurate information in case of non-compliance or “inadequate” cooperation,**
  - could be achieved by broadening the information contained in the SIR and by naming those States in regard to which difficulties remain;
Member states to be encouraged to expand the range of actions IAEA might take beyond the current binary alternative of compliance/non-compliance.

Situations could range from outstanding issues to violations of specific commitments:
- notification of such cases to the BOG,
- informing the UNSC,
- agreeing with involved States on action plans.

Strengthening IAEA safeguards will be to everyone’s benefit:

Application of a credible and effective safeguards system makes it possible to view the expansion of nuclear energy in the world with confidence
- confidence can only be built if the IAEA is in a position to offer credible assurances to countries, such as France, who wish to respond to requests for cooperation, that civil nuclear programmes being carried out by cooperating countries have exclusively peaceful purposes.

In contrast, France suggests suspension of all civil nuclear cooperation with countries who do not comply with their obligations.