Effort Bounded Inspections

Volume: 64, issue 1, June 2022, pages 39-47

Authors: Rudolf Avenhaus¹, Morton J. Canty² and Thomas Krieger³

¹_{University of the German Federal Armed Forces Munich,} ²_{Heinsberger Str. 18, D-52428 Jülich,} ³_{Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH}

Abstract:Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is described which addresses these important questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium, is presented in quite general terms, and two applications are presented.

Keywords: game theory, inspection games, resource optimization

Reference guideline:

Avenhaus, R., Canty, M.J., & Krieger T. (2022, June). Effort Bounded Inspections. ESARDA Bulletin - The International Journal of Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation, 64(1), 39-47. https://doi.org/10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4