Skip to main content
European Commission logo
ESARDA
Scientific paper

Effort Bounded Inspections

ESARDA Bulletin - The International Journal of Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Details

Identification
ISSN: 1977-5296, DOI: 10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4
Publication date
1 June 2022
Author
Joint Research Centre

Description

Volume: 64, issue 1, June 2022, pages 39-47

Authors: Rudolf Avenhaus1, Morton J. Canty2 and Thomas Krieger3

1University of the German Federal Armed Forces Munich,2Heinsberger Str. 18, D-52428 Jülich,3Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH

Abstract:Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is described which addresses these important questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium, is presented in quite general terms, and two applications are presented.

Keywords: game theory, inspection games, resource optimization

Reference guideline:

Avenhaus, R., Canty, M.J., & Krieger T. (2022, June). Effort Bounded Inspections. ESARDA Bulletin - The International Journal of Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation, 64(1), 39-47. https://doi.org/10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4

THMB_Bulletin-64_p.39-47-Avenhaus

Files

Effort Bounded Inspections
English
(2.51 MB - PDF)
Download